On the Size of the Government Spending Multiplier in the Euro Area by Fève, Patrick & Sahuc, Jean-Guillaume
7 
TSE‐396
	
 
	
	
“On	the	Size	of	the	Government	Spending	Multiplier	
in	the	Euro	Area	”	
	
	
Patrick	Fève	and	Jean‐Guillaume	Sahuc	
	
On the Size of the Government Spending Multiplier
in the Euro Area
By P F	
  J-Guscusc Susc∗
This article addresses the existence of a wide range of estimated
government spending multipliers in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium model of the euro area. Our estimation results and
counterfactual exercises provide evidence that omitting the interac-
tions of key ingredients at the estimation stage (such as Edgeworth
complementarity/subtitutability between private consumption and
government expenditures, endogenous government spending policy
and general time nonseparable preferences) paves the way for po-
tentially large biases. We argue that uncertainty on the quantita-
tive assessments of fiscal programmes could partly originate from
these biases.
JEL: C32, E32, E62.
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Stimulus packages facing the Great Recession and the ongoing consolidation pro-
grams in most EU Member States have put fiscal policy at the heart of current
economic policy discussions. A particularly debated issue is the evaluation of gov-
ernment spending multipliers, i.e. the increase in output consecutive to an increase
in government spending, on which fiscal policy choices are partly based. However,
there is not a single figure behind this concept, and a large uncertainty is surrounding
its measurement (Hall, 2009, Ramey, 2011). The value of the multiplier depends on
many factors such as the econometric approach, the underlying model, the nature
and duration of the fiscal change, or the state of the economy (see among others, Co-
gan et al., 2010, Christiano et al., 2011, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2012, Coenen
et al., 2012, Blanchard and Leigh, 2013, or Erceg and Lindé, forthcoming), leaving
the decision maker in trouble.
This paper contributes to this literature by providing an explanation for the wide
range of estimated government spending multipliers within a given dynamic stochas-
tic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of the euro area. We argue that omitting the
interactions of key ingredients at the estimation stage, through cross-equation restric-
tions, paves the way for potentially large biases. This shows up in our medium-scale
model by studying the simultaneous combination of three mechanisms: (i) Edge-
worth complementarity/substitutability between private consumption and govern-
ment spending, (ii) endogeneity of government spending and (iii) general habits in
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consumption.
These ingredients have already been considered in the relevant literature. First, the
Edgeworth complementarity/substitutability has been used to account for the aggre-
gate interaction between private consumption and public spending (see Bailey, 1971,
Aschauer, 1985, Barro, 1981 and Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1992, among others).1
While there exist many concrete examples for which private consumption and public
expenditures are complements or substitutes (health care, education, etc.),2 a proper
assessment of their degree of complementarity/substitutability remains an important
issue for any economy (in our case the euro area over the period 1985Q1-2007Q4).
Second, the endogeneity of government spending has been well documented in the
literature (see McGrattan, 1994, Jones, 2002, Curdia and Reiss, 2010, Leeper et al.,
2010, among others), and can be represented, for instance, by a simple feedback rule
on public spending that accounts for automatic stabilizers. Third, habit persistence
has proven to be a key ingredient for aggregate persistence. In most of estimated
DSGE models, habit persistence is basically represented by a one lag model in con-
sumption (see e.g. Smets and Wouters, 2007). However, the macro-finance literature
has insisted on more general specifications (including habit stock and/or local durabil-
ity, see Heaton, 1995) to more accurately replicate the joint behavior of consumption
and asset prices, including the real interest rate. Our objective is to assess how the
interplay between these three features impacts the estimated government spending
multiplier.
The mechanisms underlying the existence of bias in the estimated multiplier are the
following. First, Edgeworth complementarity/substitutability and counter-cyclicality
of government expenditures work in opposite direction. Indeed, higher level of Edge-
worth complementarity leads to increase the response of both private consumption
and output to a government spending shock, whereas a countercyclical policy acts
as an automatic stabilizer. If fiscal policy is wrongly assumed to be exogenous, an
econometrician will then underestimate the true level of Edgeworth complementarity
to match the same correlation pattern of the data (as, for example, the positive re-
lationships between private consumption and public expenditures). This translates
into lower estimates of the government spending multiplier. A wrong assessment of
the effects of government spending shocks is then obtained when automatic stabi-
lizers are not taking into account. Second, Edgeworth complementarity and habit
persistence in consumption work also in opposite direction. A high degree of habit
formation tends to reduce (not eliminate) the crowding-out effect of public spending
on private consumption. A moderate level of Edgeworth complementarity is then
needed to replicate the properties of the data. If an important dimension of habit
formation (in our case, habit stock) is wrongly omitted at the estimation stage, the
level of Edgeworth complementarity will be over-estimated to compensate the lack
of habit formation, turning to over-estimate the multiplier. This means that the
1 Public spending displays Edgeworth complementarity (resp. substitutability) with private consumption
when it increases (resp. decreases) the marginal utility of consumption.
2 As discussed in Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004), the complementarity may reveal relative inefficiency in the
provision of public goods. Let us consider the case of education. One may observe the coexistence of public
school and private tutors if the quality of public teachers is considered as being to low by the private agents.
In addition, the complementarity may occur because public education allows a higher level of income and thus
increases the demand for other goods. Similar arguments hold for health care.
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specification of the utility function matters a lot for when estimating the government
spending multiplier.
To address these two quantitative issues, we consider a medium-scale DSGE model
à la Smets and Wouters (2007). The model combines a neoclassical growth core with
several shocks and frictions. In addition to the three above mentioned features, it
includes investment adjustment costs, variable capital utilization, monopolistic com-
petition in goods and labor markets, and nominal price and wage rigidities. Our
maximum likelihood estimation with euro area data reveals (i) a high level of Edge-
worth complementarity between private consumption and public expenditures, (ii)
a countercyclical endogenous component of government spending, and (iii) a size-
able degree of habit stock. This implies that the data clearly favor a model version
including these three new features. At the same time, this framework allows us to
explain why the interactions between the three mechanisms may alter in different
ways the estimated government spending multiplier. The multiplier on impact is
around 1.30 (resp. 1.81) when wrongly omitting the endogeneity of government pol-
icy (resp. habit formation), to be compared to 1.60 in the benchmark specification.
So, the short-run effect of an increase in government spending displays a wide range
of estimates, depending on which relevant mechanism is wrongly excluded from the
empirical analysis. A similar result holds when it comes to the long-run multiplier
which is underestimated (by 25%) or overestimated (by 15%) depending on the re-
strictive assumption relative to economic policy or preferences. It is clear that both
downward and upward biases obtained here are not negligible numbers, especially if
the model is used to evaluate fiscal programs in the euro area.
Our quantitative investigations consider Edgeworth complementarity/substitutability
and general habit formation (together with automatic stabilizers) as a simple way to
account for the transmission mechanism of public spending in the euro area. Other
candidates could be considered: non-separable preferences between consumption and
leisure (Bilbiie, 2009), externalities in labor supply (Fève et al., 2011) and in pro-
duction (Devereux et al., 1996), deep habits (Ravn et al., 2006) and rule of thumb
consumers (Gali et al., 2007). We do not consider these alternative mechanisms in
the rest of the paper for at least two reasons. First, some of them (e.g. the mod-
els including externalities) are observationally equivalent to our specification when
focusing on the steady-state multiplier, but they induce severe difficulties at the es-
timation stage. Second, our estimation results indicate that they do not improve
the model’s fit, when our three modeling features are maintained. This is the case
especially when considering rule of thumb consumers. Indeed, their estimated share
remains too small (less than 7%) such that rule of thumb consumers can not be
viewed as a quantitatively relevant transmission mechanism for the effects of govern-
ment spending in our setup.3
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we expound the
DSGE model that is subsequently estimated. In Section 2, the quantitative analysis is
conducted and a model comparison is done. In Section 3, we inspect the mechanisms
at work. The last section contains the concluding remarks.
3 Coenen and Straub (2005) have shown that the share of rule of thumb consumers must be sufficiently
large to reproduce the dynamic effects of government spending, as suggested by the SVAR literature.
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I. A medium—scale model for the euro area
The present section describes our structural model of the euro area economy, which
is close to Christiano et al. (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007). The model com-
bines a neoclassical growth core with several shocks and frictions. It includes fea-
tures such as general habit formation, Edgeworth complementarity between private
consumption and government spending, investment adjustment costs, variable capi-
tal utilization, monopolistic competition in goods and labor markets, nominal price
and wage rigidities, and countercyclical government expenditures. The economy is
populated by five classes of agents: producers of a final good, intermediate goods
producers, households, employment agencies and the public sector (government and
monetary authorities).
A. Household sector
E 
Each household indexed by j ∈ [0, 1] is a monopolistic supplier of specialized la-
bor Nj,t. At every point in time t, a large number of competitive “employment
agencies” combine households’ labor into a homogenous labor input Nt sold to in-
termediate firms, according to Nt =
[∫ 1
0 Nj,t
1
εw,t dj
]εw,t
. Profit maximization by
the perfectly competitive employment agencies implies the labor demand function
Nj,t =
(
Wj,t
Wt
)
−
εw,t
εw,t−1 Nt, where Wj,t is the wage paid by the employment agencies
to the household supplying labor variety j, while Wt ≡
(∫ 1
0 Wj,t
1
εw,t−1 dj
)εw,t−1
is
the wage paid by intermediate firms for the homogenous labor input sold to them
by the agencies. The exogenous variable εw,t measures the substitutability across
labor varieties and its steady—state is the desired steady—state wage markup over the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.
Husc’ 
The preferences of the jth household display time non—separability. Following
Heaton (1995), preferences are time additive over a good called ‘services’. In ad-
dition, labor supply enters separably in the utility function given by
Et
∞∑
s=0
βsεb,t+s
(
log (St+s)−
N1+νj,t+s
1 + ν
)
,
where Et denotes the mathematical expectation operator conditional upon informa-
tion available at t, β ∈ (0, 1) is the subjective discount factor and ν > 0 is the inverse
of the Frisch labor supply elasticity. Nj,t is labor of type j, εb,t is a ‘discount factor’
shock, and the services St are defined by
St = Sd,t − h (1− δh)Sh,t,
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where Sd,t is the ‘durability stock’ governing the degree of substitutability in con-
sumption decision and Sh,t is the ‘habit stock’ governing the degree of intertemporal
complementarity in consumption (Otrok, 2001). The parameter h ∈ [0, 1] denotes
the degree of habit formation. The two stocks evolve according to
Sd,t =
∞∑
τ=0
δτdC
∗
t−τ and Sh,t =
∞∑
τ=0
δτhC
∗
t−τ ,
where δh and δh are comprised between 0 and 1 and the consumption bundle C
∗
t is
defined by
C∗t = Ct + αgGt.
Ct and Gt denote private consumption and public expenditures, respectively. The
parameter αg accounts for the complementarity/substitutability between private con-
sumption and public expenditures.4 If αg > 0, government spending substitutes
for private consumption, with perfect substitution if αg = 1, as in Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1992). In this case, a permanent increase in government spending has
no effect on output and hours but reduces private consumption, through a perfect
crowding-out effect. In the special case αg = 0, we recover the standard business
cycle model, with government spending operating through a negative income effect
on labor supply (see Aiyagari et al., 1992, Baxter and King, 1993). When the para-
meter αg < 0, government spending complements private consumption. Then, it can
be the case (depending on the labor supply elasticity) that private consumption will
react positively to an unexpected increase in government spending.
Combining the two stocks implies that services at time t are given by5
St =
1− (δh + h (1− δh))L
(1− δdL) (1− δhL)
C∗t .
As we explain below, households are subject to idiosyncratic shocks about whether
they are able to re—optimize their wage. Hence, the above described problem makes
the choices of wealth accumulation contingent upon a particular history of wage
rate decisions, thus leading to households heterogeneity. Combining the assumption
of separability between services and labor supply in the utility function with the
assumption of a complete set of contingent claims market, all the households will
make the same choices regarding consumption and will only differ by their wage rate
and supply of labor. This is directly reflected in our notations.
Household j’s period budget constraint is given by
4 The specification adopted here follows Christiano and Eichenbaum (1992), McGrattan (1994), Finn
(1998), among others. An alternative specification is a CES function between Ct and Gt (see McGrattan
et al., 1997, Bouakez and Rebei, 2007, Coenen et al., 2013). Note that these two specifications yield exactly
the same log—linearized equation for the marginal utility of consumption.
5 This specification is flexible enough to encompass many popular cases such as time—separable utility
(h = δd = 0), one lag habit formation (δh = δd = 0 ), and pure durability (h = 0).
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Pt (Ct + It) + Tt +Bt ≤ Rt−1Bt−1 +Aj,t +Dt
+Wj,tNj,t +R
k
t utK¯t−1 − Ptϑ (ut) K¯t−1,
where It is investment, Tt denotes nominal lump—sum taxes (transfers if negative),
Bt is the one-period riskless bond, Rt is the nominal interest rate on bonds, Aj,t is
the net cash flow from household’s j portfolio of state contingent securities, Dt is
the equity payout received from the ownership of firms, and Rkt is the rental rate
of capital. The capital utilization rate ut transforms physical capital K¯t into the
service flow of effective capital Kt according to Kt = utK¯t−1,and the effective capital
is rented to intermediate firms at the nominal rental rate rkt . The costs of capital
utilization per unit of capital is given by the convex function ϑ (ut). We assume
that u = 1, ϑ (1) = 0, and we define6 ηu ≡
[
ϑ′′ (1) /ϑ′ (1)
]
/
[
1 + ϑ′′ (1) /ϑ′ (1)
]
. The
physical capital accumulates according to
K¯t = (1− δ) K¯t−1 + εi,t
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It
where δ ∈ [0, 1] is the depreciation rate of capital, and S (.) is an adjustment cost
function which satisfies S (γz) = S
′ (γz) = 0 and S
′′ (γz) = ηk > 0, γz is the steady—
state growth rate of technology, and εi,t is an investment shock.
Households set nominal wages according to a staggering mechanism. In each period,
a fraction θw of households cannot choose its wage optimally, but adjusts it to keep
up with the increase in the general wage level in the previous period according to the
indexation rule Wj,t = γzπ
1−γwπ
γw
t−1Wj,t−1, where πt ≡ Pt/Pt−1 represents the gross
inflation rate, π is steady—state (or trend) inflation and the coefficient γw ∈ [0, 1] is
the degree of indexation to past wages. The remaining fraction of households chooses
instead an optimal wage, subject to the labor demand function Nj,t.
B. Business sector
F  usc
At every point in time t, a perfectly competitive sector produces a final good Yt by
combining a continuum of intermediate goods Yt (ς), ς ∈ [0, 1], according to the tech-
nology Yt =
[∫ 1
0 Yς,t
1
εp,t dς
]εp,t
. Final good producing firms take their output price,
Pt, and their input prices, Pς,t, as given and beyond their control. Profit maximiza-
tion implies Yς,t =
(
Pς,t
Pt
)
−
εp,t
εp,t−1 Yt, from which we deduce the relationship between
the final good and the prices of the intermediate goods Pt ≡
[∫ 1
0 Pς,t
1
εp,t−1dς
]εp,t−1
.
The exogenous variable εp,t measures the substitutability across differentiated inter-
mediate goods and its steady state is then the desired steady—state price markup
6 Later, we estimate ηu rather than the elasticity ϑ
′′ (1) /ϑ′ (1) to avoid convergence issues.
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over the marginal cost of intermediate firms.
I- 
Intermediate good ς is produced by a monopolist firm using the following produc-
tion function
Yς,t = Kς,t
α [ZtNς,t]
1−α − ZtF,
where α ∈ (0, 1) denotes the capital share, Kς,t and Nς,t denote the amounts of
capital and effective labor used by firm ς, F > 0 is a fixed cost of production that
ensures that profits are zero in steady state, and Zt is an exogenous labor—augmenting
productivity factor whose growth—rate, denoted by εz,t ≡ Zt/Zt−1. In addition, we
assume that intermediate firms rent capital and labor in perfectly competitive factor
markets.
Intermediate firms set prices according to a staggering mechanism. In each period,
a fraction θp of firms cannot choose its price optimally, but adjusts it to keep up
with the increase in the general price level in the previous period according to the
indexation rule Pς,t = π
1−γpπ
γp
t−1Pς,t−1, where the coefficient γp ∈ [0, 1] indicates the
degree of indexation to past prices. The remaining fraction of firms chooses its price
P ⋆ς,t optimally, by maximizing the present discounted value of future profits
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθp)
s Λt+s
Λt
{
Πpt,t+sP
⋆
ς,tYς,t+s −
[
Wt+sNς,t+s +R
k
t+sKς,t+s
]}
where
Πpt,t+s =
{ ∏s
ν=1 π
1−γpπ
γp
t+v−1 s > 0
1 s = 0,
subject to the demand from final goods firms and the production function. Λt+s is
the marginal utility of consumption for the representative household that owns the
firm.
C. Public sector
The stationary component of government spending is given by
Gt
Zt
= gG˜tεg,t,
where g denotes the deterministic steady—state value of Gt/Zt. εg,t is a government
spending shock. The endogenous component of the policy G˜t is assumed to follow
the simple rule
G˜t =
(
Yt
γzYt−1
)ϕg
.
The parameter ϕg is the policy rule parameter linking the stationary component
of government policy to demeaned output growth. If ϕg > 0, the policy rule contains
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a procyclical component that triggers an increase in government expenditures when-
ever output growth is above its average value. In contrast, if ϕg < 0, the policy rule
features a countercyclical component, and thus reflects automatic stabilizers (see e.g.
Jones, 2002, Curdia and Reis, 2010, and Fève et al., 2013). In both cases however,
assessing the degree of pro- or counter-cyclicality of the overall level of government
spending requires taking the stochastic trend in productivity into account. For ex-
ample, assuming that ϕg = 0, the growth rate of government expenditures would still
be positively correlated with total factor productivity growth.
The monetary authorities follow a generalized Taylor rule by gradually adjusting
the nominal interest rate in response to inflation and output growth:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)φr [(πt
π
)φπ ( Yt
γzYt−1
)φy](1−φr)
εr,t,
where εr,t is a monetary policy shock.
D. Market clearing and stochastic processes
Market clearing condition on final goods market is given by
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + ϑ (ut) K¯t−1.
∆p,tYt =
(
utK¯t−1
)α
[ZtNt]
1−α − ZtF
where ∆p,t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pς,t
Pt
)
−
εp,t
εp,t−1 dς is a measure of the price dispersion.
Regarding the properties of the stochastic variables, productivity and monetary
policy shocks evolve according to log (εx,t) = ζx,t,with x ∈ {z, r}. The remaining
exogenous variables follow an AR(1) process log (εx,t) = ρx log (εx,t−1)+ζx,t,with x ∈
{b, i, g}, except the substitutabilities across labour varieties and across differentiated
intermediate goods which are assumed to follow ARMA(1,1) processes, log (εx,t) =
(1− ρx) log (εx)+ρι log (εx,t−1)+ ζx,t−̺xζx,t−1, with x ∈ {w, p}, in order to capture
the moving average, high frequency component of both wages and inflation. In all
cases, ζx,t ∼ i.i.d.N
(
0, σ2x
)
.
II. Quantitative analysis
In this section, our formal econometric procedure is expounded. We then present
the estimation results of an unconstrained (hereafter referred as benchmark) and
a constrained (hereafter referred as Smets—Wouters) version of the model. The
Smets—Wouters model corresponds to the case when our three ingredients are ab-
sent
(
ϕg = αg = δd = δh = 0
)
. Finally, we discuss the implications for the estimated
government spending multipliers.
A. Data and econometric approach
The quarterly euro area data run from 1985Q1 to 2007Q4 and are extracted from
the AWM database compiled by Fagan et al. (2005), except hours worked and the
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working age population. Inflation is measured by the first difference of the loga-
rithm of GDP deflator (YED), the short—term nominal interest rate is a three month
rate (STN), and real wage growth is the first difference of the logarithm of nominal
wage (WRN) divided by GDP deflator. Private consumption growth is constructed
by multiplying real private consumption (PCR) times the private consumption de-
flator (PCD), divided by GDP deflator and transformed into first difference of the
logarithm; Private investment growth is defined as the aggregate euro area total
economy gross investment minus general government investment, scaled by GDP de-
flator and transformed into first difference of the logarithm; government spending
growth is defined as the sum of nominal general government final consumption ex-
penditure (GCN) and nominal government investment (GIN), scaled by GDP deflator
and transformed into first difference of the logarithm. Real variables are divided by
the working age population, extracted from the OECD Economic Outlook. Ohanian
and Raffo (2012) have build a new dataset of quarterly hours worked for 14 OECD
countries. We have then made an average of their series of hours worked for France,
Germany and Italy to obtain a series of total hours for the euro area. Interestingly,
the series thus obtained is very close to that provided by the ECB on the common
sample, i.e 1999Q1—2007Q4. The growth of total hours worked is the first difference
of the logarithm of total hours worked.
We follow the Bayesian approach to estimate various versions of the model (see An
and Schorfheide, 2007, for an overview). Letting θ denote the vector of structural
parameters to be estimated and ST ≡ {St}
T
t=1 the data sample, we use the Kalman
filter to calculate the likelihood L(θ,ST ), and then combine the likelihood function
with a prior distribution of the parameters to be estimated, Γ(θ), to obtain the pos-
terior distribution, L(θ,ST )Γ(θ). Given the specification of the model, the posterior
distribution cannot be recovered analytically but may be computed numerically, us-
ing a Monte-Carlo Markov Chain (MCMC) sampling approach. More specifically, we
rely on the Metropolis—Hastings algorithm to obtain a random draw of size 1,000,000
from the posterior distribution of the parameters.
We use growth rates for the non-stationary variables in our data set (private con-
sumption, private investment, government spending and the real wage) and express
gross inflation, gross interest rates and the first difference of the logarithm of hours
worked in percentage deviations from their sample mean. We write the measurement
equation of the Kalman filter to match the seven observable series with their model
counterparts. Before taking the model to the data, we induce stationarity by getting
ride of the stochastic trend component Zt and we log—linearized the resulting system
in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state. Thus, the state—space form of
the model is characterized by the state equation
Xt = A(θ)Xt−1 + B(θ)ξt, ξt ∼ i.i.d.N (0,Σξ) ,
where Xt is a vector of endogenous variables, ξt is a vector of innovations to the
seven structural shocks, and A(θ) and B(θ) are complicated functions of the model’s
parameters. The measurement equation is given by
Mt = C(θ) +DXt,
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where Mt is a vector of observable variables, that is,
Mt = 100× [∆ logCt,∆log It,∆logGt,∆log (Wt/Pt) ,∆logNt, πt, Rt],
D is a selection matrix and C(θ) is a vector that is function of the structural para-
meters.
The benchmark model contains twenty two structural parameters, excluding the
parameters relative to the exogenous shocks. We calibrate seven of them: the dis-
count factor β is set to 0.99, the inverse of the Frisch labor supply elasticity ν = 2,
the capital depreciation rate δ is equal to 0.025, the parameter α in the Cobb—
Douglas production function is set to 0.30 to match the average capital share in net
(of fixed costs) output (McAdam and Willman, 2013), the steady—state price and
wage markups εp and εw are set to 1.20 and 1.35 respectively (Everaert and Schule,
2008), and the steady—state share of government spending in output is set to 0.20 (the
average value over the sample period). The remaining fifteen parameters are esti-
mated. The prior distribution is summarized in Table 1. Our choices are in line with
the literature, especially with Smets and Wouters (2007), Sahuc and Smets (2008)
and Justiniano et al. (2010). Importantly, we specify for ϕg and αg uniform priors
centered on 0 and −1, and with a standard deviation of 1.00 and 1.33, respectively,
to reflect our agnostic view concerning these key parameters. Finally, the rate of
depreciation δd and the weight parameter on habit stock δh are assumed to follow a
Beta distribution centered on 0.50 with a standard error of 0.20.
B. Estimation results
The estimation results are reported in Table 1, together with the posterior mean
and the 90% confidence interval. Several results are worth commenting on.
First, the two model versions display very similar estimated values of the common
structural parameters. Neither the parameters related to real rigidities nor those
related to nominal rigidities are affected by the presence of Edgeworth complemen-
tarity, endogenous government policy and general time non—separable preferences.7
Second, the parameter estimates are in line with previous results (Smets and
Wouters, 2003, Sahuc and Smets, 2008, Coenen et al., 2013). For example, the
adjustment cost parameter is ηκ ≈ 4.30 and the parameter related to capital utiliza-
tion is ηu ≈ 0.60. In addition, the wage indexation parameter is γw ≈ 0.40 in the two
model versions, higher than the price indexation parameter γp ≈ 0.20. This reflects a
now standard result that the euro area data do not require too high a degree of price
indexation. The probability that firms are not allowed to re-optimize their price is
θp ≈ 0.82, implying an average duration of price contracts of about 15 months. The
probability of no wage change is θw ≈ 0.80, implying an average duration of wage
contracts of about 20 months. All these numbers are consistent with the results re-
ported in the survey done by Druant et al. (2012). The monetary policy parameters(
φπ, φy
)
≈ (1.51, 0.16) and φr ≈ 0.85 indicate that the monetary authorities act very
gradually with a large weight on inflation.
7 Note also that the parameters related to monetary policy are almost insensitive.
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Table 1–Prior Densities and Posterior Estimates
Parameter Prior Posterior
Smets—Wouters Model Benchmark Model
h B[0.70,0.10] 0.852 [0.808,0.899] 0.813 [0.745,0.886]
δh B[0.50,0.20] — — 0.429 [0.181,0.671]
δd B[0.50,0.20] — — 0.256 [0.062,0.444]
ηu B[0.50,0.10] 0.586 [0.438,0.740] 0.600 [0.454,0.750]
ηk G[4.00,1.00] 4.379 [2.934,5.833] 4.302 [2.805,5.765]
αg U [—3.30,1.30] — — —0.647 [—0.986,—0.316]
ϕg U [—2.45,2.45] — — —0.782 [—1.032,—0.536]
log (γz) G[0.45,0.10] 0.306 [0.198,0.415] 0.329 [0.217,0.439]
θp B[0.66,0.10] 0.823 [0.761,0.884] 0.815 [0.746,0.885]
θw B[0.66,0.10] 0.808 [0.719,0.903] 0.765 [0.680,0.855]
γp B[0.50,0.15] 0.195 [0.068,0.318] 0.197 [0.068,0.324]
γw B[0.50,0.15] 0.458 [0.238,0.675] 0.389 [0.185,0.592]
φr B[0.75,0.15] 0.842 [0.809,0.874] 0.849 [0.815,0.883]
φπ G[1.70,0.30] 1.509 [1.241,1.766] 1.562 [1.266,1.845]
φy G[0.125,0.05] 0.158 [0.069,0.245] 0.163 [0.067,0.255]
ρw B[0.60,0.15] 0.867 [0.788,0.945] 0.913 [0.863,0.961]
ρb B[0.60,0.15] 0.298 [0.132,0.449] 0.656 [0.478,0.833]
ρi B[0.60,0.15] 0.872 [0.785,0.961] 0.855 [0.756,0.955]
ρp B[0.60,0.15] 0.855 [0.722,0.965] 0.868 [0.752,0.989]
ρg
̺w
̺p
B[0.60,0.15]
B[0.60,0.15]
B[0.60,0.15]
0.948
0.670
0.567
[0.914,0.982]
[0.518,0.821]
[0.388,0.756]
0.951
0.725
0.610
[0.911,0.991]
[0.600,0.853]
[0.432,0.795]
σw IG[0.25,2.00] 0.144 [0.113,0.172] 0.147 [0.117,0.176]
σb IG[2.00,2.00] 2.819 [1.916,3.685] 2.073 [1.439,2.694]
σi IG[0.25,2.00] 0.273 [0.212,0.333] 0.294 [0.226,0.357]
σp IG[0.25,2.00] 0.123 [0.096,0.150] 0.129 [0.102,0.158]
σz IG[0.25,2.00] 0.813 [0.713,0.910] 0.819 [0.714,0.920]
σg IG[0.25,2.00] 0.942 [0.825,1.059] 0.955 [0.824,1.088]
σr IG[0.25,2.00] 0.126 [0.113,0.172] 0.124 [0.107,0.141]
Marginal likelihood
Posterior odds ratio
—462.546
0.000
—438.369
1.000
Note: This table reports the prior distribution, the mean and the 90 percent confidence interval
(within square brackets) of the estimated posterior distribution of the structural parameters.
11
Third, the three retained mechanisms are essential as they heavily increase the fit
of the model, as shown by the improvement of the marginal likelihood in Table 1.
The posterior odds ratios offer a complementary way of seeing this. Starting from a
prior distribution on model versions with equal probability (1/2), we obtain that the
benchmark model represents the whole probability mass. The estimated value for αg
is negative suggesting strong Edgeworth complementarity between private consump-
tion and public expenditures. This result is in the line with those obtained in Coenen
et al. (2013) for the euro area and Fève et al. (2013) for the United States. More-
over, the endogenous component of government expenditures is negatively related to
output growth.8 Finally, the parameters related to habit stock and durability are
positive and significant. This implies that the habit parameter h is higher in the
Smets—Wouters model since such a version omits habit stock in preferences.
Figure 1. Variance decomposition of a selection of variables
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Note: This figure displays the contribution of each shock to the variance
of observable variables in the benchmark model and in the Smets—Wouters
model (at posterior estimates).
Finally, we compare the two model versions by computing the forecast error vari-
ance decomposition of consumption growth, government spending growth and total
hours growth.9 This decomposition is reported in Figure 1, where the forecast hori-
zon is set to one.10 In the benchmark model, the government spending shock explains
6% (resp. 20%) of the variance of consumption growth (resp. total hours growth),
8 We also investigate various forms of the endogenous component of government spending and obtain that
the specification adopted here is preferred by the data.
9 We do not focus on the other variables as the effect of government spending shock is negligible and/or
does not differ across the two model versions.
10 The results do not differ too much when considering the contribution of the government spending shocks
at other horizons.
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whereas it is almost zero (resp. 10%) in the Smets—Wouters model. At the same
time, the share of the variance of government expenditures is the same in the two
model versions (around 56%), meaning that our key additional ingredients allow to
reinforce the transmission mechanism of government policy.
C. Implications for government spending multipliers
We can now investigate the quantitative implications of these two model versions
for the government spending multipliers. Two types of multipliers are considered.
First, the short run multiplier, defined as ∆yt+q/∆gt for q = 0, 1, ..., 40 (see Gali
et al., 2007), is obtained from the parameter estimates of the Table 1. An important
issue when it comes to the evaluation and to the comparison of short—run multipliers
between several structural models is the degree of persistence of the government
policy shock, i.e. ρg in our notation (see Aiyagari et al., 1992, and Campbell, 1995).
In our case, this is not problematic because the autoregressive parameter is almost
identical across model versions. In addition, as we have shown that the common
structural parameters are very similar, we can suspect that the short—run multipliers
are mainly driven by our three mechanisms.
Second, we consider the long—run multiplier, defined as the increase in steady—
state output consecutive to an increase in steady—state government spending expen-
ditures. Interestingly, this multiplier can be easily derived, even in a medium—scale
DSGE model, since the steady state is independent from both real an nominal rigidi-
ties. From this definition and the structure of the benchmark model, the following
proposition states key properties of the long—run multipliers.
Proposition 1. Under the benchmark model:
1) The long—run multiplier is
∆y
∆g
=
(1 + sf ) (1− αg)
1 + sf − si + ν(sc + αgsg)
,
where sc, si and sg denotes the consumption to output ratio, investment to
output ratio and government expenditures to output ratio, respectively. The pa-
rameter sf is defined by F/y, where the fixed cost F is assumed to be constant.
2) The long—run multiplier is a decreasing function of the Edgeworth complemen-
tarity parameter αg.
Proof.
1) At the deterministic steady—state (see Appendix C), the log—linearized pro-
duction function is ̂˜y = αkˆ + (1− α) nˆ, where ̂˜y = (y/ (y + F )) yˆ. From the
Euler equation on consumption, we get that (y + F ) /k and i/k are constant
and independent of g, implying that ̂˜y = kˆ = ıˆ. Plugging this in the produc-
tion function yields ̂˜y = nˆ. Otherwise, from the real wage equation, it comes
that wˆ = ̂˜y − nˆ. Using the marginal rate of substitution between consump-
tion and leisure, we deduce νnˆ = wˆ − (c/ (c+ αgg)) cˆ − αg (g/ (c+ αgg)) gˆ,
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or equivalently ν̂˜y = − (c/ (c+ αgg)) cˆ − αg (g/ (c+ αgg)) gˆ. Finally, from
the aggregate resource constraint, we get cˆ = ((y˜ − i) /c) ̂˜y − (g/c) gˆ. We
can now replacing cˆ in the marginal rate of substitution equation to obtain
yˆ = [(1 + F/y) (1− αg) (g/y)] / [1 + F/y − i/y + ν (c/y + αg (g/y))] gˆ. Know-
ing that ∆y = y × yˆ and ∆g = g × gˆ, we deduce the long—run multiplier
formula.
2) Differentiating the multiplier with respect to αg implies ∂ (∆y/∆g) /∂αg =
− [(1− sf ) (1 + sf − si + ν(sc + sg))] / [1 + sf − si + ν(sc + αgsg)]
2 < 0. 
This multiplier is obtained from the elasticities of non-stochastic steady—state em-
ployment and output with respect to public spending. The steady—state real interest
rate is independent from all frictions (both real and nominal), the government en-
dogenous policy and the exogenous process of public spending. It follows that the
output to total hours ratio is constant and thus the real wage is unaffected. Impor-
tantly, the long—run multiplier directly depends on two structural parameters related
to preferences (αg and ν) as well as on the great ratios of the economy (so implicitly
on β, δ, α). Given the fact that β, δ, α and ν are calibrated prior to estimation,
the long—run multiplier (i) depends only on the estimated value of the Edgeworth
complementarity parameter αg, and (ii) unambiguously decreases with αg. From
this property and the estimation results of Table 1, we can directly expect a higher
long—run multiplier in our benchmark model than in the Smets—Wouters model. We
now quantify this discrepancy relative to the benchmark model.
Figure 2. Short—run multiplier on output
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Note: The solid line and dashed line corresponds to the mean of the short—
run multiplier in the benchmark model and in the Smets—Wouters model,
respectively. The grey area corresponds to the 90 percent confidence interval
in the benchmark model.
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Let us first consider the short—run dynamics. Figure 2 displays the short—run
multiplier of the benchmark model together with its 90% confidence interval. For
comparison purpose, the figure also includes the multiplier obtained from the Smets—
Wouters model. On impact the multiplier is around 1.60, displays a hump pattern
and then steadily goes back to zero. Notice that the short—run multiplier remains
greater that one during almost two years. This result is in contrast with the Smets—
Wouters model for which the multiplier is around one on impact but then quickly
decreases (See Cogan et al., 2010, for a similar number). In addition, this multiplier
remains outside the confidence interval of the benchmark model during four years.
Figure 3. Dynamic responses
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Note: The solid line and dashed line corresponds to the mean of the short—run
multiplier in the benchmark model and in the Smets—Wouters model, respectively.
The grey area corresponds to the 90 percent confidence interval in the benchmark
model.
Figure 3 reports the responses of other aggregate variables. This figure shows huge
differences between the two model versions. First, the benchmark model displays
a persistent and hump—shaped response of private consumption after an increase in
public spending. In contrast, the response of consumption is persistently negative in
the Smets—Wouters model. Second, the decrease in investment is more pronounced in
the benchmark model than in the Smets—Wouters one. The reason is that Edgeworth
complementarity leads to reduce private saving, despite the increase in labor supply.
Third, the effects on inflation and the nominal interest rate of the government policy
shock are more pronounced. Such a demand shock triggers higher inflation pressures
in the benchmark model than in the Smets—Wouters model, due to a larger increase
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in the real marginal cost. For the nominal interest rate this is a direct consequence
of the Taylor rule. The dynamic responses obtained from the Smets—Wouters model
appear outside the confidence interval for almost all the selected horizon (ten years).
We now investigate the effect of a permanent change in government spending. Fig-
ure 4 reports the empirical distribution of the long—run multiplier to output obtained
from the benchmark model, together with the average long—run multiplier for the two
model versions. This figure clearly shows that the two model versions yield very dif-
ferent estimates of the long—run multiplier. Indeed, the average multiplier is around
1.04 in the benchmark model whereas it is two times smaller (0.54) when we shut
down together the three mechanisms that we put forward. Such a difference is clearly
not neutral if the model is used to assess recovery plans or consolidation programmes
in the euro area.
Figure 4. Empirical distribution of the long—run multiplier
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Note: The vertical dotted line and the dashed line correspond to the mean of
the long—run multiplier in the benchmark model and in the Smets—Wouters
model, respectively.
III. Inspecting the mechanisms
Having shown that the benchmark model generates both short—run and long—run
multipliers that exceed unity, we now inspect the key mechanisms at work after a
shock to government spending. To do so, we conduct two types of counterfactual ex-
periments. First, we shut down one or several transmission mechanisms by altering a
parameter (or a combination thereof) and we re-estimate the model using Bayesian
techniques (Counterfactual #1 in Table 2). Second, we perturb the same set of para-
meters while keeping all the other at the estimated values obtained in our benchmark
case (Counterfactual #2 in Table 2). If the implied government spending multiplier
is strongly affected in both types of counterfactual experiments, the isolated mecha-
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nism plays an essential role in the transmission of fiscal shocks. This simply means
that other forces (or parameters) are not adjusted, meaning that altering the para-
meter reveals the mechanism at work. Conversely, if the other parameters adjust
to fit the data, there exist potentially other forces that propagate the government
spending shock. In this case, we may obtain very different multipliers in the two type
of counterfactual experiments.
Table 2–Estimated effects of government spending shocks
1stQ 5thQ 9thQ LR
Benchmark 1.59 1.38 0.88 1.04
Counterfactual #1 Counterfactual #2
1stQ 5thQ 9thQ LR 1stQ 5thQ 9thQ LR
No Edgeworth Complementarity 1.01 0.72 0.40 0.55 0.96 0.73 0.44 0.55
No feedback Rule 1.28 0.81 0.49 0.74 1.65 1.09 0.69 1.04
No Habit Stock 1.65 1.41 0.88 1.08 1.61 1.28 0.79 1.04
No Local Durability 1.61 1.40 0.90 1.05 1.64 1.40 0.88 1.04
One Lag Habit 1.81 1.46 0.82 1.16 1.66 1.30 0.80 1.04
Table 3–Parameter estimates under Counterfactual #1
Benchmark (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
αg —0.650 0.000 —0.275 —0.696 —0.658 —0.776
ϕg —0.745 —0.606 0.000 —0.759 —0.746 —0.807
h 0.812 0.842 0.829 0.886 0.768 0.799
δh 0.469 0.503 0.500 0.000 0.613 0.000
δd 0.225 0.234 0.223 0.530 0.000 0.000
ηu 0.613 0.580 0.566 0.618 0.614 0.625
ηk 3.962 4.156 3.874 3.955 3.985 4.000
θp 0.829 0.832 0.817 0.833 0.834 0.835
θw 0.784 0.776 0.760 0.794 0.788 0.826
γp 0.166 0.159 0.161 0.162 0.165 0.159
γw 0.366 0.389 0.383 0.376 0.369 0.419
φr 0.853 0.855 0.850 0.850 0.854 0.846
φπ 1.558 1.553 1.588 1.544 1.564 1.507
φy 0.144 0.145 0.149 0.146 0.145 0.143
Note: (1) No Edgeworth complementarity, (2) No feedback rule, (3) No habit
stock, (4) No local durability, and (5) One lag habit.
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We concentrate our analysis on our three modeling features: (i) Edgeworth com-
plementarity, (ii) endogenous component of government spending, and (iii) habit
formation in consumption. All our experiments are reported in Tables 2 and 3. Ta-
ble 2 reports the short—run multiplier ∆yt+q/∆gt on impact (q = 0), one year after
impact (q = 5) and two years after impact (q = 9) and the long—run multiplier (i.e.
after a permanent change in the level of government spending). Remind that this
multiplier depends only on the estimated value of Edgeworth complementarity, αg,
since the other parameters in the formula remain constant (see Proposition 1). Table
3 reports the structural parameters estimates under Counterfactual #1.
A. Edgeworth complementarity
Let us first consider the role played by Edgeworth complementarity. We set αg = 0.
The first line of Tables 2 reports the quantitative results. We see that both the short
and long—run multipliers decrease heavily. This result applies for the two counter-
factual experiments. So, no other parameters can adjust to compensate the role
played by Edgeworth complementarity. This is confirmed by comparing the two first
columns of Table 3 (benchmark and no Edgeworth complementarity). Indeed, the
other model’s parameters remain almost identical under the benchmark specifica-
tion and the constrained version. The large decrease in the government spending
thus results in the crowding out effect on consumption in the absence of Edgeworth
complementarity. This mechanism thus appears essential for a proper transmission
mechanism of government spending shocks.
B. Endogenous government spending
In this exercise, we assume that government spending is exogenous (ϕg = 0). In
Counterfactual #1, the model’s parameters remain unaffected, with the noticeable
exception of αg. When ϕg = 0, the estimated value of αg decreases (it is divided
by more than 2) and both the short—run and long—run multipliers decreases, i.e. by
0.30 points which is not a negligible figure. This results comes from the interplay of
Edgeworth complementarity and countercyclicality of government spending. Indeed,
these two mechanisms work in opposite directions in terms of generating a correlation
pattern between output or consumption and government expenditures. Edgeworth
complementarity tends to increase this correlation, because it induce that agents are
willing to consume more. A countercyclical component in the government policy rule
reduces this correlation, by construction. So, in order to replicate a given correla-
tion pattern between output and government spending, a higher degree of Edgeworth
complementarity is needed to compensate a highly countercyclical government pol-
icy. This mechanically translate to higher government spending multiplier. When
the government policy is assumed to be exogenous, there is no need for high Edge-
worth complementarity, thus yielding a smaller multiplier. Consequently, omitting
the endogeneity of government spending may mask sizeable crowding in effects on
private consumption. In Counterfactual #2, setting ϕg = 0 has very little effect.
Only the multiplier on impact increases by 0.07 point. This is because, we shut down
the automatic stabilizer effect of government spending. Notice that the long—run
multiplier is the same since αg is maintained to its benchmark value. The results
18
show that omitting the endogenous policy rule at the estimation stage would lead an
analyst to under—estimate the government spending multiplier at all horizons.
C. Habit formation on consumption
We consider three cases. In the first one, we eliminate the habit stock specification
(δh = 0). For the second case, we consider a pure habit model (δd = 0). In the third
case, we specify a one lag habit, as usual in the DSGE literature (δh = δd = 0). Over-
all, our results show that omitting habit formation can have potentially strong effects
on the estimated government spending multiplier trough the estimation of αg (Coun-
terfactual# 1 in Table 2). For example, if we compare the results obtained in the one
lag habit case with those of the benchmark case, we obtain a sizeable difference in
the estimated multipliers. Both the short—run and the long—run multipliers are now
overestimated, because the estimated value of αg increases (in absolute value). The
reason for this result is the following. Suppose that the econometrician will seek to
estimate the Edgeworth complementarity, but she wrongly omits habit stock in con-
sumption. Habit formation creates intertemporal complementarity in consumption
decision and thus tends to limit the crowding out effect of public spending on private
consumption. Because habit stock is (wrongly) absent in the estimated model, there
is a need for a higher degree of Edgeworth complementarity to match the data, and
thus this implies a higher multiplier. This is illustrated by the two columns "bench-
mark" and (5) in Table 3. For example, a typical version of the Smets and Wouters
model considers only one lag in habit formation. This yields to estimate αg = −0.776
(to be compared to αg = −0.650) and then a multiplier on impact of 1.81, 0.22 point
over the benchmark one. Notice that the effects of local durability remain small.
D. Summing up
The previous analysis shed light on two opposite forces affecting the estimation
of the government spending multiplier. On the one hand, omitting the Edgeworth
complementarity (together with endogenous government spending policy) leads to
under—estimate the multiplier. On the other hand, ignoring habit stock in utility
function tends to over—estimate the multiplier. The estimation of the benchmark
model and the counterfactual exercises clearly show that (i) the first mechanism
dominates and (ii) the multiplier is mainly driven by the complementarity between
private consumption and public spending.
IV. Concluding remarks
This paper has assessed the main mechanisms at work when estimating government
spending multipliers in a DSGE model of the euro area. First, we have shown that
the level of Edgeworth complementarity between private and public consumption
is essential to fit the data and thus lead to larger multiplier. Moreover, we have
explored the consequences of misspecifying the government spending rule and habit
formation on the estimated government spending multiplier. We have notably shown
that omitting these last two features may exert a severe downward or upward biases
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on the estimated multipliers and thus can seriously affect the quantitative assessment
of fiscal stimulus.
In our framework, we deliberately abstracted from relevant details in order to high-
light, as transparently as possible, the empirical link between the three mechanisms
we pushed forward. However, the recent literature insists on other modeling or policy
issues that might potentially affect our results. We mention two of them. First, we
assumed lump-sum taxes to finance government deficit but a more realistic case could
consider distortionary taxes instead. In this latter case, we expect an even greater dif-
ference between the two model versions because taxes (labor income or VAT) would
need to go up much more in the Smets—Wouters model for a given spending hike.
Second, our paper focused on the size of the government spending multiplier in the
euro area as a whole, abstracting from any form of heterogeneity (especially fiscal)
among its members. Our framework could be extended to a model of a monetary
union to account for cross-country spillovers.
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Model Appendix
A. Equilibrium conditions
This section reports the first—order conditions for the agents’ optimizing problems
and the other relationships that define the equilibrium of the benchmark model.
Effective capital:
Kt = utK¯t−1
Capital accumulation:
K¯t = (1− δ) K¯t−1 + εi,t
(
1− S
(
It
It−1
))
It
Marginal utility of consumption:
Λt = Λh,t − β (δh + h (1− δh))Et {Λh,t+1}
and
Λh,t =
εb,t
St
+ β (δh + δd)Et {Λh,t+1} − β
2 (δhδd) Et {Λh,t+2}
Consumption services:
St = (δh + δd)St−1 − δhδdSt−2 +C
∗
t − (δh + h (1− δh))C
∗
t−1
Consumption bundle:
C∗t = Ct + αgGt
Consumption Euler equation:
Λt = βRtEt
{
Λt+1
Pt
Pt+1
}
Investment equation:
1 = Qtεi,t
[
1− S
(
It
It−1
)
−
It
It−1
S ′
(
It
It−1
)]
+βEt
{
Λt+1
Λt
Qt+1εi,t+1
(
It+1
It
)2
S ′
(
It+1
It
)}
Tobin’s Q:
Qt = βEt
{
Λt+1
Λt
[
Rkt+1
Pt+1
ut+1 − ϑ (ut+1) + (1− δ)Qt+1
]}
Capital utilization:
Rkt = Ptϑ
′ (ut)
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Production function:
Yi,t = Ki,t
α [ZtNi,t]
1−α − ZtF
Labor demand:
Wt = (1− α)Zt
(
Kt
ZtNt
)α
MCt
where MCt is the nominal marginal cost.
Capital renting:
Rkt = α
(
Kt
ZtNt
)α−1
MCt
Price setting:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθp)
s Λt+s
Λt
Y ⋆t,t+s
[
P ⋆t Π
p
t,t+s − εp,t+sMCt+s
]
= 0
Aggregate price index:
Pt =
[
(1− θp) (P
⋆
t )
1/(εp,t−1) + θp
(
π1−γpπ
γp
t−1Pt−1
)1/(εp,t−1)](εp,t−1)
Wage setting:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθw)
sΛt+sN
⋆
t,t+s
[
W ⋆t Π
w
t,t+s − εb,tεw,t+s
(
N⋆t,t+s
)ν
Λt+s
]
= 0
Aggregate wage index:
Wt =
[
(1− θw) (W
⋆
t )
1/(εw,t−1) + θw
(
γzπ
1−γpπ
γw
t−1Wt−1
)1/(εw,t−1)](εw,t−1)
Government spending:
Gt
Zt
= g ×
(
Yt
γzYt−1
)ϕg
εg,t
Monetary policy rule:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)φr [(πt
π
)φπ ( Yt
γzYt−1
)φy](1−φr)
εr,t
Resource constraint:
Yt = Ct + It +Gt + ϑ (ut) K¯t−1
∆p,tYt =
(
utK¯t−1
)α
[ZtNt]
1−α − ZtF
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B. Stationary equilibrium
To find the steady—state, we express the model in stationary form. Thus, for the
non—stationary variables, let lower—case denote their value relative to the technology
process Zt :
yt ≡ Yt/Zt kt ≡ Kt/Zt k¯t ≡ K¯t/Zt it ≡ It/Zt ct ≡ Ct/Zt
gt ≡ Gt/Zt c
∗
t ≡ C
∗
t /Zt st ≡ St/Zt wt ≡Wt/ (ZtPt) w
⋆
t ≡W
⋆
t / (ZtPt)
λt ≡ ΛtZt λh,t ≡ Λh,tZt
where we note that the marginal utility of consumption Λt will shrink as the economy
grows, and we express the wage in real terms. Also, we denote the real rental rate of
capital and real marginal cost by
rkt ≡ R
k
t /Pt and mct ≡MCt/Pt,
and the optimal relative price as
p⋆t ≡ P
⋆
t /Pt.
Then we can rewrite the model in terms of stationary variables as follows.
Effective capital:
kt =
utk¯t−1
εz,t
Capital accumulation:
k¯t = (1− δ)
k¯t−1
εz,t
+ εi,t
(
1− S
(
it
it−1
εz,t
))
it
Marginal utility of consumption:
λt = λh,t − β (δh + h (1− δh))Et
{
λh,t+1
εz,t+1
}
and
λh,t =
εb,t
st
+ β (δh + δd)Et
{
λh,t+1
εz,t+1
}
− β2 (δhδd) Et
{
λh,t+2
εz,t+2εz,t+1
}
Consumption services:
st = (δh + δd)
st−1
εz,t
− δhδd
st−2
εz,tεz,t−1
+ c∗t − (δh + h (1− δh))
c∗t−1
εz,t
Consumption bundle:
c∗t = ct + αggt
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Consumption Euler equation:
λt = βRtEt
{
λt+1
εz,t+1πt+1
}
Investment equation:
1 = qtεi,t
[
1−S
(
it
it−1
εz,t
)
−
it
it−1
εz,tS
′
(
it
it−1
εz,t
)]
+βEt
{
λt+1
λtεz,t+1
qt+1εi,t+1
(
it+1
it
εz,t+1
)2
S ′
(
it+1
it
εz,t+1
)}
Tobin’s Q:
qt = βEt
{
λt+1
λtεz,t+1
[
rkt+1ut+1 − ϑ (ut+1) + (1− δ) qt+1
]}
Capital utilization:
rkt = ϑ
′ (ut)
Production function:
yi,t = k
α
i,tN
1−α
i,t − F
Labor demand:
wt = (1− α)
(
kt
Nt
)α
mct
Capital renting:
rkt = α
(
kt
Nt
)α−1
mct
Price setting:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθp)
s λt+s
λt
y⋆t,t+s
[
p⋆tΠ
p
t,t+s − εp,t+smct+s
]
= 0
Aggregate price index:
1 =
[
(1− θp) (p
⋆
t )
1/(εp,t−1) + θp
(
π1−γpπ
γp
t−1
1
πt
)1/(εp,t−1)](εp,t−1)
Wage setting:
Et
∞∑
s=0
(βθw)
s λt+sN
⋆
t,t+s
[
w⋆t
Pt
Pt+s
Zt
Zt+s
Πwt,t+s − εw,t+s
Nνt,t+s
λt+s
]
= 0
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Aggregate wage index:
wt =
[
(1− θw) (w
⋆
t )
1/(εw,t−1) + θw
(
γzπ
1−γpπ
γw
t−1
wt−1
πtεz,t
)1/(εw,t−1)](εw,t−1)
Government spending:
gt = g ×
(
εz,tyt
γzyt−1
)ϕg
εg,t
Monetary policy rule:
Rt
R
=
(
Rt−1
R
)φr [(πt
π
)φπ ( εz,tyt
γzyt−1
)φy](1−φr)
εr,t
Resource constraint:
yt = ct + it + gt + ϑ (ut) k¯t−1/εz,t
∆p,tyt =
(
utk¯t−1
)α
N1−αt − F
C. Steady state
We use the stationary version of the model to find the steady state, and we let
variables without a time subscript denote steady-state values. First, we have that
R = γzπ/β and the expression for Tobin’s Q implies that the rental rate of capital is
rk =
γz
β
− (1− δ)
and the price-setting equation gives marginal cost as
mc =
1
εp
.
The capital/labor ratio can then be retrieved using the capital renting equation:
k
N
=
(
α
mc
rk
)1/(1−α)
,
and the wage is given by the labor demand equation as
w = (1− α)mc
(
k
N
)α
The production function gives the output/labor ratio as
y
N
=
(
k
N
)α
−
F
N
,
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and the fixed cost F is set to obtain zero profits at the steady state, implying
F
N
=
(
k
N
)α
−w − rk
k
N
.
The output/labor ratio is then given by
y
N
= w + rk
k
N
=
rk
α
k
N
.
Finally, to determine the investment/output ratio, use the expressions for effective
capital and physical capital accumulation to get
i
k
=
(
1−
1− δ
γz
)
γz,
implying that
i
y
=
i
k
k
N
N
y
=
(
1−
1− δ
γz
)
αγz
rk
.
Given the government spending/output ratio g/y, the consumption/output ratio
is then given by the resource constraint as
c
y
= 1−
i
y
−
g
y
.
In addition, we have:
λ =
γz − β (δh + h (1− δh))
γz
λh,
λh =
γ2z
γ2z − β ((δh + δd) γz − βδhδd)
1
s
,
s =
γz (γz − β (δh + h (1− δh)))
γ2z − (δh + δd) γz + δhδd
c∗,
c∗ = c+ αgg,
D. Log—linearized version
We log-linearize the stationary model around the steady state. Let χˆt denote the
log deviation of the variable χt from its steady-state level χ: χˆt ≡ log
(
χt
χ
)
. The log-
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linearized model is then given by the following system of equations for the endogenous
variables.
Effective capital:
kˆt + εˆz,t = uˆt +
̂¯kt−1
Capital accumulation:
̂¯kt = 1− δ
γz
(̂¯kt−1 − εˆz,t)+(1− 1− δ
γz
)
(ˆıt + εˆi,t)
Marginal utility of consumption:
λˆt =
γz
γz − β (δh + h (1− δh))
λˆh,t
−β (δh + h (1− δh))
(
γz
γz − β (δh + h (1− δh))
)(
λˆh,t+1 − εˆz,t+1
)
and
λˆh,t =
γ2z − β ((δh + δd) γz − βδhδd)
γ2z
(εˆb,t − sˆt) +
β (δh + δd)
γz
(
λˆh,t+1 − εˆz,t+1
)
−
β2 (δhδd)
γ2z
(
λˆh,t+2 − εˆz,t+2 − εˆz,t+1
)
Consumption services:
sˆt =
δh + δd
γz
(sˆt−1 − εˆz,t)−
δhδd
γ2z
(sˆt−2 − εˆz,t − εˆz,t−1) +
γ2z − (δh + δd) γz + δhδd
γz (γz − β (δh + h (1− δh)))
cˆ∗t
−
(
γ2z − (δh + δd)γz + δhδd
)
(δh + h (1− δh))
γ2z (γz − β (δh + h (1− δh)))
(
cˆ∗t−1 − εˆz,t
)
Consumption bundle:
cˆ∗t =
c
c+ αgg
cˆt +
αgg
c+ αgg
gˆt
Consumption Euler equation:
λˆt = Etλˆt+1 +
(
Rˆt − Etπˆt+1
)
− Etεˆz,t+1
Investment equation:
ıˆt =
1
1 + β
(ˆıt−1 − εˆz,t) +
β
1 + β
Et (ˆıt+1 + εˆz,t+1) +
1
ηkγ
2
z (1 + β)
(qˆt + εˆi,t)
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Tobin’s Q:
qˆt =
β (1− δ)
γz
Etqˆt+1 +
(
1−
β (1− δ)
γz
)
Etrˆ
k
t+1 − (rˆt − Etπˆt+1)
Capital utilization:
uˆt = ηurˆ
k
t
Production function:
yˆt =
y + F
y
(
αkˆt + (1− α) nˆt
)
Labor demand:
wˆt = m̂ct + αkˆt − αnˆt
Capital renting:
rˆkt = m̂ct − (1− α) kˆt + (1− α) nˆt
Phillips curve:
πˆt =
γp
1 + βγp
πt−1 +
β
1 + βγp
Etπt+1 +
(1− βθp) (1− θp)
θp
(
1 + βγp
) (m̂ct + εˆp,t)
Wage curve:
wˆt =
1
1 + β
wˆt−1 +
β
1 + β
Etwˆt+1 −
(1− βθw) (1− θw)
θw (1 + β)
(
1 + ν εwεw−1
) (m̂rst + εˆw,t)
+
γw
1 + β
πˆt−1 −
1 + βγw
1 + β
πˆt +
β
1 + β
Etπˆt+1 −
1
1 + β
εˆz,t +
β
1 + β
Etεˆz,t+1
Marginal rate of substitution:
m̂rst = wˆt −
(
νnˆt − λˆt + εˆb,t
)
Government spending:
gˆt = ϕg (yˆt − yˆt−1 + εˆz,t) + εˆg,t
Monetary policy rule:
Rˆt = φrRt−1 (1− φr)
[
φππˆt + φy (yˆt − yˆt−1 + εˆz,t)
]
+ εˆr,t
Resource constraint:
yˆt =
c
y
cˆt +
i
y
ıˆt +
g
y
gˆt +
rkk
y
uˆt
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